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Economic crisis and social learning for the provision of public services in two Spanish 
municipalities 
 
Abstract  
Economic crises pose challenges for the provision of public services but may also open up 
opportunities for social learning about how to achieve a sustainable society. The main 
research question addressed in this paper is: can economic crises catalyse social learning for a 
sustainable society? The hypothesis of the paper is that social learning emerges in association 
with the reduction of consumption levels that follows degrowth or with the reconfiguration of 
infrastructure management practices and sustainable innovation that could lead to a transition 
to sustainability. Following this, we empirically examine whether the crisis has led to social 
learning about the sustainable provision of public services in two similar municipalities in the 
north of Spain after the economic crisis of 2008. We develop an interpretative analysis of 
individual experiences of learning from the crisis using a set of qualitative interviews with 
individuals who were involved in key decisions about public service delivery during or 
immediately after the crisis. The analysis suggests that there has been a broader cultural 
change, which is challenging institutional models of regional development, that there has 
been a drive towards greater resource efficiency and that some opportunities have opened for 
entrepreneurs to develop sustainable innovations. The findings support the view that the crisis 
may have fostered learning responses that could lead to either degrowth or a sustainable 
transition.  
Keywords 
Social learning, economic crisis, degrowth, transitions to sustainability, sustainable 
innovation, Spain 
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1. Introduction 
Can learning from shocks foster a transition to a sustainable society? Agrawal (2011; p. 291) 
has argued that “disasters are a natural ‘reset button’—what happens in their wake is shaped 
by historical forces, to be sure, but they also enable greater leveraging power to new 
resources, fresh endeavours and innovative institutions because older structures and processes 
lose at least part of their historical force”. He highlights the example of poor communities in 
Honduras that initiated institutional change after Hurricane Mitch. This change led to more 
equitable land distribution and a reduction in the rate of forest conversion (McSweeney and 
Coomes, 2011). Do similar processes of social learning follow an economic crisis?  
An economic crisis is often understood in terms of falling GDP, lack of capital liquidity and 
high inflation or deflation. However, crises are also multi-dimensional processes that, in turn, 
lead to difficult decisions regarding the use of limited resources, which affect people’s quality 
of life and livelihoods. Barbier (2011; p. 65) argues that the combination of a fuel and 
commodity crisis since 2007 and the financial crisis in 2008 have created the right 
conjuncture for strategies to overcome ecological scarcity in the world economy. This 
requires social learning—that is, collective forms of learning that lead to broader changes in 
the organisation of societies and their relationship with ecosystems and technologies.  
Social learning occurs when social actors reflect on their values, assumptions and policies, 
and through such reflection they are able to activate a process of collective change (Reed et 
al., 2010; Castan Broto et al., 2013). It emerges in relation to joint knowledge production 
(Hegger et al., 2012). It is also a process that leads to collective decisions, where 
consequences are shared so that knowledge accumulates as part of the collective memory 
(Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2004). For learning to foster change, it should lead to a form of 
knowledge that enables the re-examination of ongoing collective actions, their consequences 
and their potential for change. Thus, social learning is often thought of in terms of learning 
loops: single loop refers to learning that corrects errors from routines; double loop refers to 
learning that re-examines values and policies; and triple loop refers to learning that develops 
new institutions (Keen, 2005). Triple loop learning requires moving from thinking about 
whether we are doing the right things to redefining what is ‘right’ to achieve structural 
change (Flood and Romm, 1997). This last aspect is central to determining the potential for 
radical change because it requires both successful innovations and a reconfiguration of 
structural barriers along with the generation of new institutions for new ways of thinking and 
acting collectively (Pahl-Wostl 2009).  
Thus, if an economic crisis makes visible the resource foundations of the economy, can a 
crisis also facilitate a process of social learning for a transition to sustainability? In this paper, 
we investigate this question in relation to infrastructure for public service delivery. 
Infrastructure is the socio-technical system that mediates the provision of public services 
supporting society and the economy. We look at infrastructure in relation to debates on the 
reduction of resource consumption through degrowth, on the one hand, and on the role of 
environmental innovation in transitions to sustainability, on the other. In this paper, we find 
that economic crisis may provide an opportunity for learning in relation to cultural change, 
new practices in the use of resources and the emergence of sustainable innovations. The 
extent to which this contributes to a fundamental change or transformation, however, is not 
clear. Our findings are supported by empirical evidence from an interpretative study of 
learning experiences from crisis in two towns in the north of Spain.  
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2. Infrastructure reconfigurations and social learning 
Social learning questions the hegemonic norms, values and conventions that mediate human 
interactions and exchanges. As economic growth is the dominant economic imperative—
shaping both society’s perceptions of human welfare and the attempts to attain it—an 
institutional change of the kind we advocate would entail situating infrastructure within the 
context of an alternative paradigm, for example, degrowth and economic contraction 
(Schneider et al., 2010). In terms of reconfiguration of material and technological systems, 
social learning refers to the establishment of new relationships with infrastructure, thereby 
gaining the capacity to alter their material disposition and uses through the introduction of 
sustainable innovations (Boons et al., 2013). These are two interrelated ways of thinking 
about sustainable transitions in infrastructure to which we turn in the next two sections.  
2.1 Social learning as cultural change: enabling degrowth 
Degrowth proponents are concerned with the material limits to the economy and our ecology, 
and thus, they argue for the contraction of economic processes to protect future resource 
scarcity. Degrowth is defined as “an equitable downscaling of production and consumption 
that increases human well-being and enhances ecological conditions at the local and global 
level, in the short and long term” (Schneider et al., 2010; p 511). Sustainable degrowth, 
however, is not associated with a total contraction, but rather with the preservation of social 
services and quality of life through cultural change that aims to maximise happiness beyond 
societies’ current associations with material consumption.  
Degrowth debates are linked to debates on sustainable consumption (Lorek and Fuchs, 2013). 
Matthey (2010), for example, has focused on the issue of whether, as a collective society, we 
can change our aspirations to consume less. Social learning is regarded here as a matter of 
influencing multiple individual choices, which collectively may lead to a reduction of 
consumption levels. Similarly, Hamilton (2010; p. 571) argues for a process of cultural 
change towards ecological consciousness and that such process “will depend either on severe 
environmental shocks or, one can only hope, a widespread change in the process of self-
creation induced by a collapse of public confidence in the consumer life”. To an extent, this 
envisages crises as events that allow individuals to reassess their aspirations and personal 
identities. Economic crises do indeed lead to a reduction of consumer confidence and overall 
rates of consumption, but maintaining lower levels of consumption would also require 
changing consumer aspirations.  
However, the type of cultural change required for degrowth requires a reconfiguration of the 
nature and context of consumption. Degrowth entails a simultaneous cultural and material 
rearrangement that would ensure its long-term viability. This means a cultural change that 
questions the type of society where we want to live. This cultural change goes hand in hand 
with re-envisaging the economy away from the marketisation of commodities, looking 
instead into the possibilities of non-profit and cooperative forms of social economy 
(Johanisova et al., 2013). While such reconfiguration is predicated on the need to question 
neoliberal approaches to understanding and managing the economy, it is most often located 
not on centres of decision-making, but within citizens who actively respond to the demands 
of a sustainable future. Social learning is key to building citizens’ trust in new governance 
systems for degrowth (Domènech et al., 2013). 
What role could a crisis play in a cultural change towards degrowth? On the one hand, the 
crisis can be a means to expose citizens to degrowth. Experiences of crises in Cuba, for 
example, have led to a situation in which people are fed with fewer fossil resources, while 
providing labour-intensive employment, with a range of social benefits, including social 
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inclusion and health benefits, but at the expense of people’s sense of hope and trust in the 
system (Borowy, 2013). Gaining trust also requires meeting people’s collective aspirations of 
a good society. However, aspirations can change. They are a specific cultural-historical 
construct (Schneider et al., 2010), structured by institutions—and material objects—that 
shape attitudes and orientations towards life (Hamilton, 2010). The crisis can expose those 
collective aspirations, and change them. In this way, the 2008 crisis raised critiques not only 
about the sustainability of the current economic system but also about the suitability of 
associated political and social systems (Juknys et al., 2014). The question is whether citizens 
can move from a critique of the status quo to social learning for change. Whitehead (2013), 
for example, emphasises degrowth as a strategy to realise ‘radical communitarian 
approaches’ to urban living. These imply strategies regarding local economic welfare that 
focus more “on quality of life, the provision of good, wholesome food and time for family 
and friends, rather than on economic growth per se” (North and Longhurst, 2013). Urban 
approaches to radical sustainability such as these focus on grassroots mobilisation as a way to 
change perspectives and cultural practices but also to influence the generation of new 
institutions and policies. A crisis will lead to social learning for degrowth if it can create a 
broad cultural change, most likely through grassroots movements, and generate new 
institutions to regulate more sustainable socio-ecological interactions.  
2.2 Social learning as socio-technical reconfiguration: infrastructure transitions 
From a socio-technical perspective, the quest for sustainability does not reside in the 
development and implementation of a silver-bullet technology or even a range of 
technologies. Rather, the technological change required to achieve more sustainable 
economies and societies requires a reorganisation of social practices and the technologies 
associated with these.  
The concept of regime is at the centre of ideas of socio-technical change. Regimes are 
relatively stable arrangements of social norms, institutions, artefacts and the expert and 
mundane practices associated with them, which are generally understood to be resistant to 
change (see, for instance: Geels, 2002; Kemp et al., 1998). Sustainable technologies represent 
purposive attempts to mediate a transition towards systems that either consume less or 
promote forms of consumption that can be maintained over time with the existing resources 
available. This calls for the type of socio-technical reorganisation that is implied in a 
transition (see Elzen et al., 2003). A key aspect to achieve sustainability is to precipitate 
major transitions in existing socio-technical regimes by aligning localised innovations with 
windows of opportunity such as those that open up, for example, because of a crisis.  
Sustainable innovations are simply innovations that reduce environmental impacts and the 
use of resources (Carrillo-Hermosilla et al., 2010). Sustainable innovation in particular is 
connected not just to the development of new environmental technologies but also to social 
innovations, such as new business models or new institutions that embed such technologies in 
society (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013; Boons et al., 2013). Sustainable innovations are 
characterised by both ‘radicalness’, the extent to which they challenge established methods of 
operating, and ‘systemness’, the extent to which they can transform the larger social systems 
in which they are embedded (Boons et al., 2013). Previous research has examined the role of 
entrepreneurs in forging new institutional structures that enable a systemic impact (Block and 
Paredis, 2013; Thompson et al., 2015). Thus, we ask whether crises foster actions with the 
potential to develop sustainable innovations.  
Perez (2013), for example, argues that the current crisis opens up the opportunity for entering 
a ‘green golden age’. She finds evidence in past crises, such as the Railway Mania that in the 
mid-1850s that led the way for the “Victorian boom” or the heavy engineering boom at the 
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end of the nineteenth century that led the way for the “Belle Époque” in Europe. Although in 
each case, the particular technological configurations were different, in every case the crisis 
led to major opportunities. Given the constraints of resources, the training of green 
professionals and other cultural and social factors, a period of green prosperity may follow 
appropriate regulations of current financial institutions, without necessarily challenging 
mainstream ideas of economic growth and development.  
Loorbach and Lijnis Huffenreuter (2013) take a similar position but with greater emphasis on 
how to observe the potential transition as it happens in localised spaces. They describe the 
economic crisis as both a symptom of the unsustainability of current socio-technical systems 
and as an accelerator of a process of systemic change. First, the crisis is associated with 
limitations in the way land and resources are approached and appropriated within current 
socio-technical systems in which “dominant responses seek to restabilise historical patterns 
of consumption and production” (p. 36). Thus, the crisis opens up “a window of opportunity” 
for “structurally different and more sustainable states” that can “reinforce lock-in of 
incumbent regime structures” (Loorbach and Lijnis Huffenreuter, 2013; p. 37). The results 
will depend on the extent to which actors making decisions within the crisis react to 
alternatives and generate true reconfigurations of infrastructure beyond a Schumpeterian 
analysis of sustainable technologies. In this way, crisis fosters sustainable innovations that 
directly challenge dominant socio-technical regimes, with examples including “food and 
energy cooperatives, mobility sharing, cooperative social services, public-private 
cooperatives and financial organisms” that share characteristics such as “a focus on broader 
value definitions, self-organisational structures, explicit links to local communities, 
sustainable technologies and low-impact but high quality lifestyles” (Loorbach and Lijnis 
Huffenreuter, 2013; p. 41). Social learning from a socio-technical perspective will be related 
with the extent to which these interventions fostered by the economic crisis have enabled 
“opportunities and levers to promote the shifts in ways of doing, thinking and organizing” 
(Bos et al., 2013).  
[Insert Figure 1] 
This paper investigates whether social learning can emerge from an economic crisis. Both 
degrowth and analyses of socio-technical transitions help to link the forms of learning that 
emerge from crisis with the wider possibilities for transformation but are not explicit about 
how social learning could look like. Figure 1 represents different ways in which social 
learning may happen beyond individual learning, in relation to a re-evaluation of values or a 
fundamental change in systems of provision. The three boxes represent the moments in which 
change starts through 1) lifestyle and cultural changes; 2) new institutions to manage 
infrastructure and resources; and 3) sustainable innovation. These three mechanisms of 
change provide an analytical framework for the identification of potential instances of social 
learning, as explained below.   
3. Methods 
To evaluate the paper’s hypothesis, we conducted an interpretative analysis of individual 
accounts of learning during the crisis, focusing on public service delivery as a key area for 
sustainability improvements. The 2008 crisis in Spain, which had a direct impact on the 
management of infrastructure at the local level, provided a key setting in which the 
hypothesis could be studied. In Spain, local governments are in charge of public services, 
including street lighting, waste collection, water provision, road access, street and sewer 
cleaning, parks, libraries, markets, social services, sports facilities and slaughterhouses 
(Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2012).  
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Our research strategy was to build two comparable case studies. This strategy is especially 
suited to study contemporary phenomena with particular emphasis in understanding not just 
what happens but also how and why it happens (Yin, 2013). The strategy focused on 
selecting two critical cases that enabled understanding the extent to which learning could 
happen or not (Flyvbjerg, 2006), although with the aim to generate modest and context-based 
generalisations (Payne and Williams, 2005). With this aim, we selected two case studies of 
medium-sized towns, where you would not expect great movement of capital but which 
nevertheless were strongly affected by the economic crisis. Jaca and Sabiñánigo are two 
similarly sized towns, north of the Spanish region of Aragón, less than 20 km apart. Jaca is a 
historic city, the residence of the first Aragonese king, Ramiro I, in the ninth century. Since 
the 1960s and 1970s, the city has promoted itself as a tourist centre for winter sports. In 
contrast, Sabiñánigo was a small village in the 1900s but saw rapid growth during the 
twentieth century, following the establishment of the railway and chemical and aluminium 
industries. Towards the end of the twentieth century, both towns had a similar population of 
approximately 10,000, but had very different economies. Jaca had large service and 
residential sectors and high proportion of floating population that attracted franchises and 
commercial businesses. Sabiñánigo had a predominantly working-class population that was 
dependent on the big industries, which were hit by an industrial crisis in the 1990s. As 
industries closed, both towns competed to become the tourist gateway to the Pyrenees.  
In each case, we made a list of known infrastructure projects that, according to the local 
press, had been hit during the economic crisis in 2008 or were blamed for it. We conducted 
19 interviews in July 2013 with 25 individuals who had played a role in any of those projects. 
Most of our interviewees, all but six, were male. We found interviewees using both project 
documentation and recommendations from other interviewees. The sample includes public 
and private actors because in Spain, municipal services are delivered under a range of modes 
of service provision that include public and private actors, and some private-led projects also 
entail the provision of public infrastructure (either in partnership with or contracted by 
municipal governments). 
Each interview, lasting from half an hour to two hours, explored different topics in relation to 
the individual’s position and participation in different infrastructure projects. The interviews 
captured interviewees’ subjective experiences of learning at the specific moment of the 
interview. They followed a five-point interview guide on 1) the context of the work of the 
interviewee; 2) how the crisis had affected the interviewee; 3) what difficult decisions the 
interviewee had made during the crisis; 4) what lessons had been learned and who had 
learned them (also probing whether learning was perceived as individual or collective); 5) 
what proposals the interviewee had for the future in terms of service delivery, training and 
social change.   
The interviews were transcribed and coded. Adopting an interpretative approach, a single 
coding category was used in an exploratory round of coding to identify instances of self-
reported learning. Learning experiences were further analysed in a second round of coding 
looking at the attribution of learning. We thus classified instances of individual learning, in 
which learning was explained as a personal experience, and instances of shared or collective 
learning, in which learning was attributed to social and/or professional communities. A 
further round of coding was used to link instances of individual and collective learning with 
the two hypotheses proposed in the theoretical review (de-growth and systems innovation). 
The last step of analysis linked the findings with theoretical and empirical debates. First, the 
findings were situated in relation to a background review of the impacts of the crisis in Spain, 
documented with local and national statistics in section 4. Second, the findings were read in 
relation to the literature review, which led to the clarification of the hypotheses and the 
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refinement of the framework presented in Figure 1. Following this framework, findings are 
presented in three subsections of section 4 attending at lifestyle and cultural changes; 
institutional changes in the use of resources; and sustainable innovations.  
4. The economic crisis in Spain as an infrastructure shock 
The economic crisis that hit Spain in the late 2000s had devastating social and economic 
consequences. It followed an economic boom that relied on the construction industry as the 
main engine for economic growth and employment. When the construction industry faltered, 
so did the banks that had invested on it. In the third quarter of 2008, the economy started to 
contract (Figure 2). While the news reported the failings of giant businesses, such as 
construction companies (Mulligan, 2008), in the streets people sharply felt the growth of 
unemployment rates (Figure 3). A wide process of social mobilisation followed the crisis 
(Anduiza et al., 2014). 
 
[Insert Figures 2,3] 
The economic crisis has left an imprint in the infrastructure landscape. The construction 
boom fostered the development of grandiose projects, and second-residence villages 
mushroomed beyond the usual touristic spots. Moreover, early responses to the crisis, which 
assumed confidence and growth would soon be restored, promoted investment in 
infrastructure as a means to generate economic growth. When financial means faulted, 
ongoing works were paralysed or delayed. Finished works were not given use and 
maintenance was stopped. The scars of the crisis are visible in the Spanish landscape, as are 
the infrastructure and the social and economic fabric it sustains.  
To what extent did the crisis foster social learning? The crisis is now the primary topic of 
conversation both in the media and on the street. Consumption in households decreased 7.8% 
from 2007 to 2011, and the progressive reduction of the indicator of consumer confidence 
suggests that previous levels of consumption will not be attained any time soon (according to 
data from the National Institute of Statistics (INE) and the Centre for Sociological 
Investigation (CIS)). Degrowth is indeed happening, but it is still received with dismay by 
political and economic commentators. Broader socio-technical changes are less visible at the 
national scale, although some scattered initiatives are highlighted from time to time, such as 
the platform INCREASIS (IDIY, 2015), for example, which seeks to re-envision unused 
urban spaces for their transformation into productive infrastructure. There is, however, a 
question about whether such initiatives are confined to niches, or whether broader processes 
of social learning are extending through the Spanish society. 
[Insert Figures 4,5] 
Given their different economic structure, Jaca and Sabiñánigo went through different 
economic cycles prior to the crisis. Figure 4 shows the different rhythms in the output of the 
construction sector, which peaked in Jaca in 2003 and in Sabiñánigo, where land prices 
remained considerable lower, in 2006. However, in 2008, both towns were directly hit by the 
crisis, as is visible in the unemployment figures (Figure 5). The crisis left behind a landscape 
of empty houses and infrastructure whose purpose is not clear. Serviced areas now stand 
empty as spaces for future housing that is still to come. Big iconic projects, initially intended 
to foster a distinct identity for each of the towns, are now subject to a torrent of criticism. The 
future of suburban developments around newly built golf courses is yet undecided, as neither 
town has achieved the status of luxury resort they aspired to. Big transport infrastructure that 
politicians and businessmen considered crucial for the future economic development of the 
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towns—both to attract tourists and to facilitate the transport of industrial products—stand half 
built, adding to the already complicated economic position of both towns. 
4.1 Lifestyle and cultural changes 
The crisis has changed perceptions of what is acceptable, in terms of lifestyles and public 
interventions. All interviewees, without exception, expressed outrage at what could 
collectively described as mindless spending in the period prior to the crisis, and they 
extracted lessons for the post-crisis context. Slow growth an unemployment (Figures 2, 3 and 
5) are linked to personal experiences of lowered salaries, unemployment and hopelessness, 
and hence, many of the lessons learned are directly linked to personal experiences and 
practices. A business owner, for example, emphasised that “the first lesson is that people 
value money better, more than before. ‘Tips’ are scarce” (Interviewee 22, BM, Jaca1). The 
word ‘tip’ in this sentence represents a metaphor, not just that people give fewer tips in a 
service context, but rather, that people have less money to spare for lifestyle-related activities, 
such as those that sustain tourism in both Jaca and Sabiñánigo. Overall, this perception 
translated into material changes in relation to infrastructure needs. For example, an engineer 
in charge of waste collection services explained that for him, the diminishing rates of waste 
was a clear indicator of “what is happening with the economy”, in particular, a reduction in 
levels of consumption (Interviewee 4, CS, Jaca).  
All interviewees stated in different ways that there had been a redefinition of personal needs 
as a form of individual learning. Some established a direct connection between the experience 
of the crisis and the realisation of the importance of saving: “What I have learned, although in 
the end you never do it, is that you must keep something, you must save instead of, when you 
earn any money, run to invest it in anything…” (Interviewee 25, P, Sabiñánigo). This ‘rush to 
invest’ is linked to a sense of collective responsibility for the extravagances that took place 
prior to the crisis: “We all lived beyond our means… Now we have a bit more control.” 
(Interviewee 17, IMU, Jaca). For some, the bubble followed the wishes of a generation that 
“spent everything they earned, and we created our needs in relation to our income, without 
thinking about the future”. They refer to is as transitory collective madness: “We were crazy. 
We were rich. This was the land of milk and honey. Who had the largest car? I remember 
conversing with friends: ‘I have been in a new bar and I have paid €10 per drink’. We were 
showing off!” (Interviewee 15, IMU, Sabiñánigo).  
All civil servants explained that a key challenge of the crisis was to manage a heightened 
‘public demand’ for an ever-increasing level of services that sustained pre-crisis levels of 
consumption. Some emphasise how public spending was perceived as acceptable: “this is an 
economic crisis, but it is also as social crisis, an ideological crisis, a political crisis. It does 
not only belong to politicians: it belongs to the media, to everyone. Everyone was buying 
houses, and when they were selling an old one they were already speculating to buy a new 
one” (Interviewee 6, CS, Huesca). The crisis thus demonstrated that the large public and 
private investments that took place during the period leading up to 2008 were “impossible to 
maintain, and furthermore, they generated a fictitious society and a complicated future. [We] 
generated an expectation about having the services of a mega-city such as Madrid in any 
small town. Buildings that are not used, employees whose job cannot be kept if there is not 
enough demand, and not having revenues to consolidate the investment…” (Interviewee 19, 
P, Jaca). This perception emerges not just in relation to the construction of large iconic 
projects or large infrastructure but also at a more mundane level, in relation to the 
                                                 
1
 According to ethics conventions, interviews are anonymised, but information is provided about the category of 
interviewee (Politician (P), Business manager (BM), Civil servant (CS), Infrastructure manager or user (IMU)) 
and the location of the interview.  
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expectations of daily services such as waste collection, street lighting or sport facilities: “If 
everybody is accustomed to a lighting level, when you reduce it [during crisis], people 
protest, but maybe the problem is that you were providing an excessive service… We 
habituated people to abnormal levels…. It is not just the crisis that justifies returning to lower 
levels. Simply put, it is rational” (Interviewee 7, CS, Sabiñánigo).  
For many, the crisis has shifted the boundaries of acceptability, making visible the mistakes 
of the past: “In terms of infrastructure, it is only now that you see some projects and you ask 
yourself ‘how could they spend any money on that?’. And then it does not even meet the 
purpose for which it was made. However, I do not think we can move onto the next step, that 
is, block the progress of some infrastructure…” (Interviewee 2, CS, Jaca). This has generated 
interest not just in the projects themselves, but in the governance mechanisms that enabled 
such projects to proceed. The crisis has not only brought together people to question or even 
stop a given project, but moreover, to evaluate and look into budgetary spending: “We have 
learned to not keep quiet. Before, people turned a blind eye to what happened. However, now 
we pay attention to what politicians do or not do” (Interviewee 17, IMU, Jaca). For those in 
the administration, the crisis has revealed that infrastructure with a strong visual impact (e.g., 
those dedicated towards recreation or tourism, such as sports grounds, theatres or museums) 
was prioritised over more immediate needs to renovate the basic infrastructure: in the context 
of crisis, there is a regret that certain works of infrastructure modernisation were not 
undertaken when there were funds available to do so: “We have gone from everything to 
nothing in less than five minutes. From those grandiose, mammoth structures, with doubtful 
economic or social benefits, to not having enough funds to maintain existing infrastructure.… 
the tendency has been towards building a concert hall, a library, which is good, but the 
emphasis on visible infrastructure has been detrimental to the maintenance of the most basic 
ones, such as lighting and water... because citizens do not seem not care about renewing the 
pipes as long as water continues coming from their taps.” (Interviewee 13, CS, Sabiñánigo). 
Lack of resources means that some of that infrastructure cannot be put to use because of the 
lack of human resources: “The infrastructure alone is not enough, it needs a purpose…. 
Before people would say ‘c’mon, let’s construct a building, it will fill by itself’, but now, this 
needs human resources to put it into practice” (Interview 1, CS, Jaca).  
Interviewees reflected on prodigality as a disease affecting Spanish society. Sabiñánigo 
interviewees, particularly, regret the project of a luxurious spa in the Pyrenees, the most 
salient example of a large, lavishly funded project. A company worker explains that 
“Everything was done as big as possible, without care for expenses… these were also people 
who were seen as god-like in their capacity for investment… I am the King Midas and 
everything I touch becomes gold. In the end it was the opposite” (…) “The Company worked 
in a fictitious manner… because before the crisis, it had open access to credit. It only needed 
to ask… many companies, especially developers, operated in that way” (Interviewee 10, BM, 
Sabiñánigo). Such emphasis on prodigality not only fostered mammoth projects with the 
enthusiastic support of participating municipalities but also promoted disregard for the 
adequate management of projects. A manual worker whose contract was terminated during 
the crisis expressed his puzzlement when the true state of the accounts of his company, which 
was building access roads, was revealed: “It is an issue of control, of people, of everything. 
You may assume that when you do great work, there is going to be a splurge, and if you 
make an initial budget, you may go over it a little… but what is not normal… is that spending 
multiplies… it is one thing to spend a bit more than planned and another is to not to have a 
budget at all…” (Interviewee 20, IMU, Sabiñánigo).  
These examples reflect how the crisis has led to individual learning about what is acceptable 
consumption, both in terms of examining individual’s lifestyles and in terms of the vision of 
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the city that is put forward. While this was reported as individual learning, it was very 
common in all interviews both in Sabiñánigo and Jaca, suggesting perhaps a form of cultural 
change that goes beyond these specific localities. This cultural change partly explains the 
acceptance of a reduction in the rates of municipal expenditure (Figure 6) and the emergence 
of a new set of demands for public services which includes an evaluation of what is actually 
needed.  
4.2 Institutional changes and the management of scarce resources 
Lack of capital during and after the crisis has affected all economic sectors, from the limited 
resources in governmental institutions to a reduction of consumption and lack of available 
capital. The crisis has led to an immediate reduction of services, which is reflected in 
municipal budgets (Figure 6). In both municipalities, expenditures depend on and mirror 
income. Apart from the relative size of the budget (in 2012, Jaca spent €1565 per capita, 
while Sabiñánigo spent about half of that, €822 per capita), Jaca’s expenditures show a 
greater variation during the crisis period, with an increase in the budget of 160% between 
2000 and 2006, and a rapid decrease of 40% over the next six years. In Sabiñánigo, 
expenditures increased 90% up to 2006, and have been decreasing faster, at 45%, since then. 
In both cases, budgets have maintained a higher level of expenditure than prior to the bubble.  
[Insert Figure 6] 
Given the reduction in expenditures, two types of investment have been prioritised: efficiency 
improvements and revalorisation of underused resources. Some interviewees lamented that 
the crisis had not just stopped ‘pharaonic projects’ but also “that we have stopped everything, 
that which is necessary and that which is not” (Interview 13, CS, Sabiñánigo). For many, 
services thought of as essential have been reduced or completely stopped. Municipal officials 
explain this by saying that the crisis has led to prioritisation exercises to assess both the need 
for infrastructure and how it affects the population concerned: “We have reduced our 
budget... Now we can only do smaller works, and we need to prioritise. There has also been a 
reduction in external funds, and now we focus on smaller works that benefit more people.” 
(Interviewee 1, CS, Jaca). In most cases, this has also meant an emphasis on efficiency: “The 
option of developing new infrastructure has disappeared. [For] the infrastructure we have, 
they must be as cheap as possible, and in some cases, we are even thinking of eliminating 
them. However, this is a drastic decision that no politician wants to make… they don’t want 
to close the ice rink, or the swimming pools, or any other infrastructure. Even if they are not 
fundamental or essential, nobody will make such a decision. So, what is the solution? That 
such infrastructure consumes as little as possible, and with as few Euros as possible.” 
(Interviewee 7, CS, Sabiñánigo). This also explains the maintenance of relatively high levels 
of expenditure after the crisis, despite the cuts.    
Improving efficiency has become a priority for investment, both in the public and the private 
sector: “The little funds we could invest we have invested in making efficiency gains. We 
have renewed the street lighting infrastructure to reduce consumption. We have changed 
heating installations to reduce the consumption of electricity and increase the consumption of 
biomass” (Interviewee 8, P, Jaca). This search for efficiency has affected every organisation. 
Private businesses have equally moved to “keeping the muscle and removing the fat” 
(Interviewee 14, BM, Sabiñánigo), both through more efficient use of infrastructure and 
resources and through the management of human resources. This positive outlook, however, 
contrasts with the contraction of the construction sector in both towns (Figure 4). 
Efficiency demands have led to important institutional changes in the chain of infrastructure 
management. Achieving greater operational efficiency in public and private organisations had 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
12 
 
translated to expanding in-house service delivery. Local governments, for example, have 
focused on developing in-house “tasks that until now were externalised” (Interviewee 5, CS, 
Sabiñánigo). In the private sector, “before the crisis, for any minor issue, you could outsource 
the repair of any breakdown”, but things have changed radically, as “now we tend to do 
everything in-house” (Interviewee 9, IMU, Sabiñánigo). Resource efficiency is at the centre 
of infrastructure management practices. 
There is a dual process of adjustment and restructuring that depends on the extent to which 
the demand has actually been reduced and on the possibilities to redefine different 
components of the service. One interviewee, for example, explained how those readjustments 
depended on them “working with older materials… for which we do not have replacements” 
(Interviewee 4, CS, Jaca). Materials are reused, even “things that have some wear, and before 
the crisis you would have changed them without a thought, but now you think that they can 
still work” (Interviewee 9, IMU, Sabiñánigo). Nine interviewees highlighted that the 
maintenance of infrastructure was a key concern for them, which related not just to the 
limited resources that were available for maintenance—and that had a direct impact on 
whether infrastructure is maintained—but also to the fact that some of the largest structure, 
such as Jaca’s ice rink, had excessive maintenance costs, and not covering them would mean, 
in the long term, the degradation of infrastructure because “if you leave them without 
maintenance, in a few days you may as well throw it away” (Interviewee 13, CS, 
Sabiñánigo).  
Maintenance is related to use. That is why, together with an emphasis on achieving greater 
efficiency, the crisis has also been related to an interest to re-value underused resources, 
including infrastructure and land, as well as the potential for local work, local knowledge and 
local models of development that were overlooked during the construction boom. For 
example, any remaining subsidies have been directed towards interventions that “add value to 
resources that are currently underutilised, focus on rehabilitation instead of new 
developments, or help to re-value resources that are already within the territory” (Interviewee 
1, CS, Jaca). For local municipalities, this is a question of using infrastructure and empty 
buildings “to avoid letting them die” (Interviewee 10, BM, Sabiñánigo), while also reusing 
“land and other private spaces in a precarious way until the public equipment can be 
deployed” (Interview 5, CS, Sabiñánigo).  
This learning within a network of managers, employers and customers, seems to generate 
institutional change to provide a similar level of public services with reduced resources, 
leading to a collective rethinking of the standards for service and maintenance.    
4.3 Sustainable innovations 
Economically, the crisis in these towns has led not only to a diminished interest in 
construction and tourism and the associated negative effects on the economy (Figures 4-6) 
but also to a focus on potential alternatives in primary production and trade that can sustain 
livelihoods, as reflected in the rising number of self-employed citizens. These cultural 
changes create spaces for sustainable innovation, particularly in relation to the development 
of social economic networks and the promotion of new collective solutions for sustainable 
local economies.   
Municipal officials have noticed an increase in applications for business licenses: “Lately, we 
have many applications for opening businesses. People who want to be self-employed. 
Unemployed people becoming freelancers who open their own businesses… so, surprisingly, 
many small businesses are starting activity… self-employment is generated by people of 
approximately 40-45 years who tell themselves, ‘I better build up my job or I will not have 
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one’… and they do anything: clothing stores, sports, spinning, pilates, yoga, cleaning 
services, any kind of professional activities, lawyers… such is the business landscape” 
(Interviewee 5, CS, Sabiñánigo). Here, self-employment is linked to the lack of more 
traditional employment opportunities: “people, when they are unemployed, they look for self-
employment opportunities. Here in Jaca, recently, there has been a considerable increase in 
self-employment, looking for any alternative to generate an income and subsist….” 
(Interviewee 17, IMU, Jaca). This is consistent with the municipal statistics for employment, 
which reflect a drastic reduction of people who are self-employed in the construction and 
industrial sectors, but it is also reflected in the modest increases of people registered in 
agriculture and services, approximately 7% (these sectors only employ 7% of the population 
in Jaca and 5% in Sabiñánigo). 
Some interviewees noticed another type of self-employment linked to micro-businesses with 
very little capital, based on the “model of entrepreneur who is very young, with little 
experience, very brave, who relies on resources from his parents and has no family 
responsibilities….” (Interviewee 3, CS, Jaca). These accounts are accompanied by a set of 
caveats about how many of those new enterprises subsist and the extent to which their 
sustainability depends on their ability to establish linkages and demand for new services and 
draw future capital from other locales. However, the multiple examples emerging in these 
anecdotal accounts suggest an aggregate effort at finding alternatives to reshape the economic 
situation in the region. This is a landscape of innovation, linked to self-employment, which 
focuses on alternatives for livelihood that do not depend on mainstream regimes of 
construction and a model of tourism based on winter sports.  
In particular, there is a clear interest in forms of new localism that emphasise the use of 
personal skills within a particular setting and in relation to the available resources within a 
given locale, in terms of linking opportunities for self-employment with responsible 
consumption. Self-employment emerges from a commitment to the values and resources 
within a given region. Some entrepreneurs have found inspiration in traditional crafts, and 
“public institutions and private organisations are making efforts to recognise shepherds as 
professionals, or cheesemakers, or even the blacksmith who is making sheep bells” 
(Interviewee 3, CS, Jaca). Other innovations have focused on creating markets for wool, or 
demonstrating the viability of biomass boilers in an area with access to forest resources. The 
biomass plant in Ansó, a village near Jaca, involves a public-private partnership, but its 
development is fostered by individuals who seek self-employment: “this is an example of 
entrepreneurship. It started during the crisis, and they faced many problems, especially with 
regards to the environmental legislation… but they have been able to take it forward” 
(Interviewee 4, CS, Jaca). This project will create employment based upon a local resource, 
wood, and a concern with creating sustainable alternatives for energy provision.  
Another example of local innovation aimed at developing opportunities for sustainable 
livelihoods is the public-led institution Adecuara (Association for the integral development of 
the Cradle of Aragón), which has received funding from EU structural funds (2007-2013). 
After the crisis, Adecuara saw an opportunity for ‘integral development’ to promote small 
food industries as a novel alternative to the main pillars of the economy around tourism, 
heavy industry and construction. The crisis left a legacy of unused infrastructure, such as 
warehouses and associated equipment. Through discussions, Adecuara utilised this 
infrastructure as space for two business incubators, one in Jaca and one near Sabiñánigo, for 
small food industries to develop and market their products without needing a large amount of 
start-up capital. Such incubators will provide would-be entrepreneurs with collective facilities 
including packaging and labelling infrastructure, health and safety equipment, offices and 
storage. Moreover, the incubators will enable businesses to operate seasonally, based on the 
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availability of local resources, for example, through the timing of jam production, depending 
on the fruits available, or the collection of honey from the end of the summer to mid-autumn. 
For those involved in it, the incubator could only happen in this post-crisis context because 
the crisis helped to reveal the potential for the agrifood sector, highlighting the lack of capital 
in the sector (Interview 1, CS, Jaca). In this example, the innovation of supporting 
agribusiness through the redevelopment of infrastructure is tightly linked with other forms of 
social innovation, and in particular, the promotion of cooperativism as a way to address the 
costs of innovation.  
In this way, for many—especially in government—collaboration, rather than individual 
entrepreneurship, emerges as a means to build sustainable business models. Alongside calls 
for collaboration and cooperativism, there is a greater emphasis on local and artisanal 
products and the possibility of accessing new markets at a modest scale while generating 
sustainable employment opportunities through the creation of “networks of social economy, 
or solidarity, which are independent for legal definitions and formulas” (Interview 2, CS, 
Jaca). Other examples include neighbourhood associations that take responsibility for 
unmanaged infrastructure, collectives that support micro-development through sharing or 
crowd-funding, or local governments that reimagine public uses for empty buildings. In 2013, 
these emerged as experimental strategies, yet they demonstrate that in the post-crisis context, 
there is an interest in the generation of social and institutional innovation that responds to 
demands for public services and employment. 
In Jaca, the business incubator has received a negative response from some business leaders 
in the area who do not see the potential for the development of the agrifood industry. These 
business leaders argue that such a model does not match ‘the vocation of the land’: tourism. 
They understand artisanal production only as it is linked to food tourism (Interviewee 21, 
BM, Jaca). Here, we see the strength of long-established models of development, in which 
the agrifood industry is not an employment-generating activity in its own right, but rather, 
something that should support the main tourism industry. The artisanal producer is thought of 
as something else to ‘visit’, a complement to winter sports, resorts and hotels. The economic 
crisis disrupted discourses of construction and industrial development, but not necessarily 
those that emphasised the tourism-based model of development that Jaca relied upon. Thus, 
while in Sabiñánigo there is clear support from government and business leaders for 
cooperative models of development, in Jaca there are vocal critiques that resist abandoning a 
strongly entrenched model of development. Active opposition to these government-led 
innovation projects in Jaca is likely to halt alternatives to the tourism and construction model 
of development that led to the crisis in the first place.  
5. Discussion 
Can we see a radical change emerging from any of the three forms of social learning 
investigated here? The first section shows that the crisis changed perceptions of what is 
acceptable both in terms of lifestyle and public expenditures. In Sabiñánigo, particularly, 
there are renewed arguments seeking to redefine which levels of public service provision are 
acceptable, a key aspect to support governance initiatives towards degrowth (Domènech et 
al., 2013). Moreover, the crisis has made visible the unsustainability of some infrastructure. 
Crises are key moments in which the political economy of infrastructure provision becomes 
visible (Graham, 2010). Interviewees question not just the levels of provision but also the 
purpose of projects that look unacceptable in the post-crisis period. These instances of 
learning are mostly discussed as a form of individual learning, as a change in personal views 
about the town and its development, both in Jaca and Sabiñánigo. However, it is difficult to 
determine the extent to which these changes in views are leading to broader social or cultural 
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change. All over the country, there have been post-crisis political mobilisations to protest 
against the political class, and especially, how public spending cuts and mortgage 
repossessions have affected the most vulnerable (e.g., Anduiza et al., 2014), but the emphasis 
is on blaming the political class for the process that led to the crisis, rather than pointing 
towards any form of social learning.  
In terms of institutional change, there is a drive towards increasing efficiency in all aspects of 
service delivery, as in business operations. Local government and businesses are pushed 
towards greater infrastructure efficiency, both in terms of resource use and streamlining 
management processes. Practices that seemed reasonable before the crisis—e.g., the disuse of 
new materials because they did not conform to aesthetic specifications—now seem 
unimaginable. Moreover, there is greater emphasis on the reuse of land and materials. 
Planning is now directed towards recuperating empty spaces within the city. This resonates 
with recent contributions to the degrowth debate, which have emphasised the processes 
whereby degrowth can be achieved and the extent to which a reduction of resource use 
follows economic degrowth (Infante Amate and González de Molina, 2013). However, there 
is a question about whether this is a response to the lack of resources, rather than true 
institutional change. Restraint in municipal expenditures is not taking place at the same speed 
as increases in expenditure took place during the bubble. The level of services needs to be 
maintained, regardless of consumption levels or public demands, for example, in providing 
waste collection services to small localities that depend on the town’s municipality or in 
providing adequate maintenance of roads during the winter. While some of this evidence no 
doubt can be interpreted as contributing to the critique of degrowth (van den Bergh, 2011), 
we believe that it also points towards the specific challenges of looking at degrowth in 
practice (Sekulova et al., 2013) and that degrowth policies, within or without a crisis, will 
need to be carefully consider in relation to the context of implementation and the specific 
demands of those who are deemed to be affected by them. This broader cultural change is 
visible in both towns.  
There is also ample evidence in these two towns that the crisis has led to opportunities for 
sustainable innovation related to an increase in self-employment and an emphasis on local 
produce as an opportunity for economically sustainable livelihoods. The crisis may have 
created an environment conducive to sustainability entrepreneurs, but there is less evidence 
that such entrepreneurs are actually able to influence their institutional environment, as 
shown by Thomson et al. (2015). There is some incipient evidence of new business models, 
such as micro businesses, the use of local resources and cooperative management, but the 
evidence is anecdotal. One innovative initiative has been the incubator for local businesses, 
which combined both a cooperative model of infrastructure management with the support of 
the government via the use of European Union structural funds. Following the definition of 
sustainable innovation above, the incubator is remarkable both because of its newness and 
because, if successful, it will challenge the whole economic system (cf. Boons et al., 
2013).We remain optimistic about this project because it resonates with previous experiences 
in transitions management showing that government initiatives can support individual 
businesses in developing sustainable innovation in the transition to sustainability (Loorbach 
and Wijsman, 2013). However, the cases demonstrate how the context of innovation can 
shape opportunities for broader transitions. In Jaca, the economic crisis did not pose a direct 
challenge to the dominant tourism-based discourse of economic development, and thus, 
innovative projects have encountered vocal resistance. In Sabiñánigo, however, there has 
been a complete dismissal of the construction industry without a revival of tourism, which 
has led to greater enthusiasm for alternative, industry-based models of development. What 
the case studies show is not just the risk of absorption within the market-based system 
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(Johanisova et al., 2013), but also, that actors successful in advancing the dominant model of 
economic development may actively hinder learning from the economic crisis. In this respect, 
each town’s opportunities for change are related to their cultural identity and how this 
identity shapes local economic discourses and management practices. 
Overall, the results show that the crisis has fostered cultural changes in terms of reframing 
what is acceptable in service provision, forced organisations to streamline resource use, and 
created spaces for entrepreneurs willing to develop social innovations. The extent to which 
this constitutes a transformation will require further investigation, but in this study, we can 
conclude that the crisis has opened up spaces for learning. Nevertheless, learning emerges in 
relation to what has been questioned. Unlike a natural catastrophe, where there is a challenge 
to every actor in society, a man-made crisis emerges together with discourses of 
responsibility allocation, which directs learning possibilities to certain people and certain 
sectors and limits its potential impact in certain contexts. 
6. Conclusion  
Crises bring a strong wave of destabilisation that challenges modes of operation and creates 
new spaces for innovation. Insofar as the crisis has changed what is acceptable in society, 
there has been a process of social learning associated with it. However, the economic crisis 
did not challenge the economic system as a whole, but rather, a model of development linked 
to construction and credit. The long-standing model of tourism development in Jaca, for 
example, stands as a model to be defended despite the crisis and the initiatives that have 
emerged after the crisis.  
The cases suggest that we should not rush to draw positive conclusions about the possibilities 
of economic crises. In Spain, the crisis has not brought new actors—banks still control 
investment capital, and while they may not have the resources they once had, they still have 
the same rhetoric about profit making, and that drives outcomes. The result is that the state of 
play remains the same, both in terms of discourse and action. This thus points towards the 
political economy of sustainability and the extent to which local actors can truly challenge it. 
The focus of the analysis on two specific case studies enables a context-specific analysis of 
learning experiences but drives attention away from the broader political economy factors 
within which actors operate. In particular, the analysis shows that despite the changes in 
discourses and the drive towards greater efficiency, expenditure levels have not been 
radically cut. Moreover, while sustainable innovations are being nurtured in Sabiñánigo, they 
are being actively contested in Jaca because the economic crisis did not question the 
dominant model of tourism-based development. A discourse of the crisis linked only to the 
construction sector and led by politicians may be hindering opportunities for social learning 
about sustainability in cases such as Jaca.   
Moreover, there are limits to the study of self-reported accounts of learning as far as being 
able to infer that actual social learning has occurred. In particular, we are concerned that too 
little time has passed to establish social learning in the sense that social learning should 
transcend the moment of learning because it refers to institutional change over time. We have 
now an opportunity to initiate longitudinal analyses of case studies such as these which will 
explain to future generations the social learning that emerged from the economic crisis in 
2008 and what was its impact. Also, historical analyses of cultural changes in relation to 
transformations of material and energy flows constitute a grounded way of understanding 
social learning as it relates to structural changes in society. However, in the quest for 
sustainability and the need for a societal transition, not all of the lessons can be learned 
through historical or longitudinal analysis. Thus, sociological, interpretative analysis of the 
type presented here provides a window for the understanding of how people explain their 
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own actions and operate in the world as they interpret it. Further interpretative research in 
diverse contexts of crisis and prosperity is urgently needed to understand both how to change 
broader cultures of consumption and resource use and how to create opportunities for 
sustainable innovation.  
References 
Agrawal, A., 2011. Economics: A positive side of disaster. Nature 473, 291-292. 
Anduiza, E., Cristancho, C., Sabucedo, J.M., 2014. Mobilization through online social 
networks: the political protest of the indignados in Spain. Information, Communication & 
Society 17, 750-764. 
Barbier, E.B., 2011. Transaction costs and the transition to environmentally sustainable 
development. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 1, 58-69. 
Block, T., Paredis, E., 2013. Urban development projects catalyst for sustainable 
transformations: the need for entrepreneurial political leadership. Journal of Cleaner 
Production 50, 181-188. 
Boons, F., Lüdeke-Freund, F., 2013. Business models for sustainable innovation: state-of-the-
art and steps towards a research agenda. Journal of Cleaner Production 45, 9-19. 
Boons, F., Montalvo, C., Quist, J., Wagner, M., 2013. Sustainable innovation, business 
models and economic performance: an overview. Journal of Cleaner Production 45, 1-8. 
Borowy, I., 2013. Degrowth and public health in Cuba: lessons from the past? Journal of 
Cleaner Production 38, 17-26. 
Bos, J.J., Brown, R.R., Farrelly, M.A., 2013. A design framework for creating social learning 
situations. Global Environmental Change 23, 398-412. 
Carrillo-Hermosilla, J., del Río, P., Könnölä, T., 2010. Diversity of eco-innovations: 
Reflections from selected case studies. Journal of Cleaner Production 18, 1073-1083. 
Cuadrado-Ballesteros, B., García-Sánchez, I.-M., Prado-Lorenzo, J.-M., 2012. Effects of 
different modes of local public services delivery on quality of life in Spain. Journal of 
Cleaner Production 37, 68-81. 
Domènech, L., March, H., Saurí, D., 2013. Degrowth initiatives in the urban water sector? A 
social multi-criteria evaluation of non-conventional water alternatives in Metropolitan 
Barcelona. Journal of Cleaner Production 38, 44-55. 
Flyvbjerg, B., 2006. Five misunderstandings about case-study research. Qualitative inquiry 
12, 219-245. 
Geels, F.W., 2002. Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: a 
multi-level perspective and a case-study. Research Policy 31, 1257-1274. 
Graham, S., 2010. When infrastructures fail in: Graham, S. (Ed.), Disrupted cities: when 
infrastructures fail. Routledge, London. 
Hamilton, C., 2010. Consumerism, self-creation and prospects for a new ecological 
consciousness. Journal of Cleaner Production 18, 571-575. 
Hegger, D., Lamers, M., Van Zeijl-Rozema, A., Dieperink, C., 2012. Conceptualising joint 
knowledge production in regional climate change adaptation projects: success conditions and 
levers for action. Environ. Sci. Policy 18, 52-65. 
IDIY, 2015. Todo por la praxis, Madrid. 
Infante Amate, J., González de Molina, M., 2013. ‘Sustainable de-growth’ in agriculture and 
food: an agro-ecological perspective on Spain’s agri-food system (year 2000). Journal of 
Cleaner Production 38, 27-35. 
Johanisova, N., Crabtree, T., Fraňková, E., 2013. Social enterprises and non-market capitals: 
a path to degrowth? Journal of Cleaner Production 38, 7-16. 
Juknys, R., Liobikienė, G., Dagiliūtė, R., 2014. Sustainability of catch-up growth in the 
extended European Union. Journal of Cleaner Production 63, 54-63. 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
18 
 
Kemp, R., Schot, J., Hoogma, R., 1998. Regime shifts to sustainability through processes of 
niche formation: The approach of strategic niche management. Technology Analysis & 
Strategic Management 10, 175-198. 
Loorbach, D., Wijsman, K., 2013. Business transition management: exploring a new role for 
business in sustainability transitions. Journal of Cleaner Production 45, 20-28. 
Loorbach, D.A., Lijnis Huffenreuter, R., 2013. Exploring the economic crisis from a 
transition management perspective. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 6, 35-
46. 
Lorek, S., Fuchs, D., 2013. Strong sustainable consumption governance – precondition for a 
degrowth path? Journal of Cleaner Production 38, 36-43. 
Matthey, A., 2010. Less is more: the influence of aspirations and priming on well-being. 
Journal of Cleaner Production 18, 567-570. 
McSweeney, K., Coomes, O.T., 2011. Climate-related disaster opens a window of 
opportunity for rural poor in northeastern Honduras. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 108, 5203-5208. 
Mulligan, M., 2008. MARTINSA-FADESA files for administration. Financial Times. July 
15, 2008. 
North, P., Longhurst, N., 2013. Grassroots Localisation? The Scalar Potential of and Limits 
of the ‘Transition’ Approach to Climate Change and Resource Constraint. Urban Studies 50, 
1423-1438. 
Payne, G., Williams, M., 2005. Generalization in Qualitative Research. Sociology 39, 295-
314. 
Perez, C., 2013. Unleashing a golden age after the financial collapse: Drawing lessons from 
history. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 6, 9-23. 
Plummer, R., FitzGibbon, J., 2004. Some observations on the terminology in co-operative 
environmental management. Journal of Environmental Management 70, 63-72. 
Schneider, F., Kallis, G., Martinez-Alier, J., 2010. Crisis or opportunity? Economic degrowth 
for social equity and ecological sustainability. Introduction to this special issue. Journal of 
Cleaner Production 18, 511-518. 
Sekulova, F., Kallis, G., Rodríguez-Labajos, B., Schneider, F., 2013. Degrowth: from theory 
to practice. Journal of Cleaner Production 38, 1-6. 
Thompson, N.A., Herrmann, A.M., Hekkert, M.P., 2015. How sustainable entrepreneurs 
engage in institutional change: insights from biomass torrefaction in the Netherlands. Journal 
of Cleaner Production. 
van den Bergh, J.C.J.M., 2011. Environment versus growth — A criticism of “degrowth” and 
a plea for “a-growth”. Ecological Economics 70, 881-890. 
Whitehead, M., 2013. Neoliberal Urban Environmentalism and the Adaptive City: Towards a 
Critical Urban Theory and Climate Change. Urban Studies 50, 1348-1367. 
Yin, R.K., 2013. Case study research: Design and methods (Re-edited). Sage publications, 
London. 
 
 
INDIVIDUAL LEARNING COLLECTIVE LEARNING
LEARNING THAT LEADS TO A 
REEVALUATION OF PERSONAL 
VALUES
LEARNING THAT LEADS TO A 
REEVALUATION OF SYSTEMS OF 
PROVISION
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
LIFESTYLE AND CULTURAL 
CHANGES 
SUSTAINABLE INNOVATION 
Collective learning 
that fosters de-growth
Collective learning 
that fosters a         
transition to            
sustainability
Figure
 Figure 2: Percentage change in Gross Domestic Product in relation to previous period (Data 
source: INE) 
  
Figure 3: Unemployment rate from 2000 to 2013 (Data source: Eurostat) 
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Figures 2-5
 Figure 4: New buildings in Jaca and Sabiñánigo (total number; data source: Aragon’s 
Institute of Statistics) 
 
Figure 5: Evolution of the unemployment rate (unemployed annual average/total population) 
in Jaca and Sabiñánigo (source: Aragon’s Institute of Statistics) 
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 Figure 6: Evolution of municipal expenditure in Jaca and Sabiñánigo (€)(source: Aragon’s 
Institute of Statistics) 
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